University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 1 Number 1 – 2 — Fall 1989/Winter 1990

Article 15

1989

Evolution of the Unobviousness Standard: 35
U.S.C. § 103 for Design Patents
Wallace R. Burke
United States Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Burke, Wallace R. (1989) "Evolution of the Unobviousness Standard: 35 U.S.C. § 103 for Design Patents," University of Baltimore Law
Review: Vol. 19: Iss. 1, Article 15.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol19/iss1/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

EVOLUTION OF THE UNOBVIOUSNESS STANDARD:
35 U.S.C. § 103 FOR DESIGN PATENTS
Wallace R. Burket
I.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of obviousness in patent law and the related statutory
requirements are embodied in the Patent Act of 1952. This Article traces
the history and evolution of the standard for design patentability under title
35, section 103 of the United States Code.
II.

DE~IGN PATENTS AND THEIR HISTORY

Although Congress, acting under its constitutional powers to protect
the writings of authors and the discoveries of inventors, passed copyright
and patent laws in 1790, I no subsequent statutory protection for designs was
enacted for more than half a century. The first provisions for the protection
of new and original designs for a manufacture were included in the Patent
Act of 1842,2 which also set forth specifically the classes of patentable
designs. An amendment enacted in 1902 dropped the 1842 classifications
for the general term "article of manufacture" in describing those designs
subject to protection. 3 Also, the 1902 amendment replaced the term "useful," which had given rise to some confusion, with the term "ornamental.,,4
The statutory design provisions now in effect were enacted as part of
the Patent Act of 1952, title 35 of the United States Code. The basic design
provision appears in section 171, which provides: .. Whoever invents any
new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title. The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall
apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.,,5 Under section
173, the term of design patent protection is fourteen years. 6

A.

Design Patentability Determinations Prior to the Patent Act of 1952

Prior to the Patent Act of 1952, the Patent Office and the courts generally concluded that a design was not patentable simply because it could be
distinguished from a prior design. To be patentable a design's creation had
to involve an exercise of the inventive faculty. 7 If, in the judgment of the
t B.S., 1951, Howard University. Supervisory Design Patent Examiner, United States
Depar1lrn:!:l!9fCQ.m.m~rce.J~atent

and Tra~emark Office,

G~ouj!

A!! lJnit 291. ___ _

I. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, I Stat. 109. repealed by Act of July 4. 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

117.125.
Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263. 5 Stat. 543.
See Act of May 9,1902, ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193.
See generally W. SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DEstGNS (1929).
35 U.S.c. § 171 (1988).
[d. § 173 (1988).
See, e.g., Ex parte Knothe. 1903 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 42 (1903).
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Patent Office and the courts, a design application Claim or a design patent
claim did not involve an exercise of the inventive faculty, patentability
would be denied or the design patent claim would be invalidated because the
claim lacked invention. This rationale was 'based on the Patent Act of 1902
which, as interpreted by the courts, required that a design be invented in
order to be patentable. 8
Lack of.invention was interpreted in various ways by the early courts.
In Knapp v. Will & Baumer CO.,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit concluded that the right to make any article round, square,
or in any other standard form or shape, is inherently open to all. Thus, a
design- claim differing from the prior art merely by changing its shape to a
standard form lacked invention. lo Northrup v. Adams ll held that putting
molding around the edges or sides of articles might be pleasing in appearance, but was not patentable. 12 In Collender v. Griffith,13 it was held that. a
billiard table with bevelled sides and ends lacked invention. 14
Furthermore, prior to 1952, courts differed as to the standard of inventiveness that should be used to determine design patentability. For example,
in the case of Untermeyer v. Freund, 15 the court stated:
It is impossible to read the literature upon this subject without
being convinced that the courts, though applying the same 'rules,
have looked with greater leniency upon design patents than patents
for other inventions. : : . A design patent necessarily must relate
to subject-matter comparatively tdvial. The object of the law is to
encourage those who have industry and genius sufficient to originate objects which give pleasure through the sense of sight. 16

Following this same reasoning, the court in Smith v. Stewart l7 held: "The
invention in a majority of patent designs is very small, and of a low order.,,18
On the other hand, in the case of Cahoone Barnet Manufacturing Co. v. Rubber & Celluloid Harness Co., 19 the following statement was made by the
court:
[I]t may be taken as settled that, to sustain a design patent, there
must be exhibited in the production of the design an exercise of
8. See, e.g., Mygall v. M. Schauffer-F1aum Co., 191 F. 836 (2d Cir. 1911). See generally W.
SYMONS. THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS (1914).
9. 273 F. 380 (2d Cir. 1921).
10. [d. at 384-85.
11. 18 F. Cas. 374 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1877) (No. 10,328).
12. [d. at 375.
13. 6 F. Cas. 104 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 3(00).
14. Id. at 105.
15. 37 F. 342 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889).
16. /d. at 345.
17. 55 F. 481 (C.C.E.D. Pa.), affd, 58 F. 580 (3d Cir. 1893).
18. Id. at 483.
19. 45 F. 582 (C.C.D.N.J. 1891).
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the inventive or original faculty as clear and of as high a degree as
is called for in patents for inventions or discoveries. In the latter
class there must be novelty and utility; in the former, beauty and
originality. In both, the final production must have been engendered by the exercise of brain power, and to such an extent that it
may be said to be born of genius. 20

B.

Courts Frustration with Patentability Determination Prior to the 1952
Patent Act

The Design Patent Act of 1902 required a design to be new, original,
and ornamental in order to be patentable. 2 1 As indicated above, the requirement that a design be an invention was judicially created. Defining what
was an invention proved to be elusive. Nearly a century ago, the Supreme
Court, in a ruling on utility subject matter, addressed the difficulty of
defining the term "invention" as follows:
The truth is the word cannot be defined in such manner as to
afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular
device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not. In a
given case we may be able to say that there is present invention of
a very high order. In another we can see that there is lacking that
impalpable something which distinguishes invention from simple
mechanical skill. Courts, adopting fixed principles as a guide,
have by a process of exclusion determined that certain variations
in old devices do or do not involve invention; but whether the variation relied upon in a particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a question which cannot be answered by
applying the test of any general definition. 22
This impression of the invention standard resulted in an inconsistent and
unpredictable body of law, because it required that the decision of patentability be based ultimately on the subjective whims of a reviewing court. 23
In the 1952 revision of the patent laws, the novelty and ornamentality
requirements were maintained and recodified under 35 U.S.c. §.§ 102, 171.
The retention of these requirements did not, however, completely define the
concept of patentability. Missing was the essential quality which goes
20. Id. at 585.
21. Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193.
22. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).
.
i3. Tn this regard, Judge Giles S. Rich, one of the coauthors of § 103, stated:
In the final analysis, all [the "invention" standard] amounted to was that if
the court thought the invention, though new and useful, was not patentable,
then it did not involve "invention" and vice versa. The requirement for "invention" was the plaything of the judges who, as they became initiated into its mysteries, delighted to devise and expound their own ideas of what it meant; some
very lovely prose resulting.
Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GED. WASH. L. Rev. 393,404 (1960).
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beyond mere newness and utility for mechanical patents, and newness and
ornamentality for design patents-that "something" that the courts had
unsuccessfully strived for by the use of the term "invention." In order to
promote uniformity in the application of the patent laws, Congress enacted
section 103. 24 In section 103, Congress replaced the judicially imposed
requirement of invention with the requirement of nonobviousness. 25
Section 103 received its definitive interpretation in Graham v. John
Deere CO. 26 The Graham Court, in calling for "strict observance" of section 103's requirements, laid out the analysis to be followed in cases involving the obviousness standard:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law. the
§ 103 condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of
which must be satisfied, lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at.
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. 27
C.

The Transition Period: Implementation o/the 1952 Patent Act

Between 1952 and 1966, courts generally interpreted section 103 as
requiring a display of something more than that required of "a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains.,,28 The decision of In re Warren 29 stated that for "a design to be inventive [it] must producea substantially different aesthetic effect. . . which is something more
than that of the ordinary artisan or designer.,,3o In re. Zemon 31 concluded
24. 35 US.C§ 103 (1988). Section 103 provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or desct:ibed 3$ set forth in section 102 of this title. if the differences between the
slJbject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a ~hole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the an to which said subject matter pertains:· Patentability
'shall not be negatived by the manner in which the'invention was made.
Subject matter dev~loped by another person. which qualifies as prior art only
under subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability
under this section where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the
time the invention was made. owned by the same person or subject to an obligation
of assignment to the same person.

Id,
25. Under the 1952 Act. the word "invention" was statutorily defined as any "invention or discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (1952). Thus. an invention which is novel. original. and ornamental is a patentable invention. A design which is lacking one or more of the criteria is an unpatentable invention.
26. 383 US. I (1966)..
27. Id. at 17 (citation omitted).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
29. 194 F.2d 715 (C.C.P.A. 1952).
30. Id. at 717 (citations omitted).
31. 205 F.2d 317 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
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that a patentable design "must be the result of an unusual talent, not within
the reach of the ordinary artisan or designer.'>32 In the case of In re
ROUSSO,33 the appellant urged that there was a lower standard of patentability required for design patents than for other patents. The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) in Rousso, however, held that it did "not regard
appellant's contention as being a correct statement of law.,,34 The Rousso
court pointed out that the appellant had overlooked Nat Lewis Purses. Inc. v.
Carole Bags. Inc.,35 where the Second Circuit had held that "a design patent
must be the product of 'invention,' by which we mean[] the same exceptional talent that is required for a mechanical patent.,,36
That same standard, requiring consideration of what would be obvious
to a person of ordinary skill in the art, appears to have been used by the
CCPA in holding a design for a treillage patentable in In re Braun. 37 The
Braun court.stated: "[T]he disclosure of the reference, combined with ordinary ornamental iron work desi~ning skill, would not result in appellan(s
design as the obvious outcome." 8
Decisions in other courts generally were in agreement with the previously noted obviousness standard. That is, a valid design patent must
reveal a greater skill than that exercised by the ordinary designer who is
charged with knowledge of the prior art. 39 . The Seventh Circuit in Amerock
Corp. v. Aubrey Hardware Manufacturing. Inc. 40 held: "It is settled beyond
dispute that '[a] design patent, in order to be valid, must disclose a design
that is new, original and ornamental, unanticipated and inventive in character, and beyond the skill of the ordinary designer or draftsman.' ,,41 Further, the CCPA in In re Glavas42 seemed to have impliedly recognized specialization among designers. The Glavas court held that a designer of
devices useful in one field would not be expected to look in search of design
suggestions to devices having remote utility. The Glavas opinion stated:
It is evident that a worker seeking ideas for improving the appearance of a device would look first to the similar devices of the prior
art for ideas. If his problem were one of designing a float for
swimmers, he would not be likely to turn to bottles, soap or razor
blade sharpeners for suggestions, as was done by the board here,
32. Id. at 318.
33. 222 F.2d 729 (C.C.P.A. 1955).
34. Id. at 731.
35. 83 E2d 475 (2d Cir. 1936).
36. Ruusso, 222 E2d at 731 (quoting Nat Lewis Purses 83 F.2d at 476).
37. 275 F.2d 738 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
38. Id. at 740.
39. See. e.g., General Time Instruments Corp. v. United States Time Corp.• 165 F.2d 853 (2d
Cir.). eert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948).
40. 275 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1960).
41. Id. at 348 (quoting Spaulding v. Guardian Light Co.• 267 F.2d III, 112 (7th Cir.). em.
denied. 361 U.S. 883 (1959».
42. 230 E2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
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and accordingly the presence in any of the last-named devices of
some particular element of configuration would not normally suggest the adaptation of that element to a float. 43

D.

The Patentability Standard of In re Laverne

In In re Laverne, 44 the CCPA gave an interpretation of the requirements
of section 103 as applied to design applications and patents which differed
significantly from previous court decisions rendered after the 1952 Patent
Act. The Laverne court, in reaching its conclusion as to the proper standard
for determining design patentability under section 103, put forth the following:
What is "the art to which the subject matter pertains" in this
case? Is it the molded chair "art" or is it the ornamental design
"art"? In what field is the "inventor" of the design operating?
Since those who create designs are designers, not chair makers, it .
would seem to follow that he is operating in the field of industrial
design and that it is the "art" invol~ed.
In the field of design, the analysis is not so easy. Design
inventing or originating is done by designers. The examiner here
'has referred to "the expected skill of a competent designer" as the
basis of comparison. However, if we equate him with the class of
mechanics, as the examiner did, and refuse design patent protection to his usual work product, are we not ruling out, as a practical matter, all patent protection for ornamental designs for articles
of manufacture? Yet the clear purpose of the design patent law is
to promote progress in the "art" of industrial design and who is
going to produce that progress if it is not the class of "competent
designers?"
Following the mandate of section 103, it would seem that
what we have to do is to determine obviousness to the ordinary
intelligent man. The test is inherently a visual test, for the design
is nothing more than appearance, and the appearance is that of the
article as a whole. No special skill is required to determine what
things look like, though individuals react differently. It is bound
to be an individual reaction. 4s

Laverne's new standard of "obviousness to the ordinary intelligent
man" was intended to replace the previous court rulings which had required
nonobviousness to be based on the ordinary designer standard. This new
43. Id. al451.
44. 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
45. Id. al 1005-06 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted),
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standard, however, ignored the Supreme Court's Graham v. John Deere
CO. 46 analysis, which had set forth the conditions to be followed in cases
involving the obviousness standard.

E.

Reaction of Federal Courts to the Nonobviousness Standard

. Between 1966 and 1981, the federal courts did not agree as to which
standard should be used in determining nonobviousness in design cases.
Addressing this issue, the Tenth Circuit in Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Products, Inc. 47 reviewed the findings and conclusions
of the trial court which had "noted the division among the circuits on the
applicatio~ of the nonobviousness test in the area of design patents.,,48 The
Ninth Circuit had adopted the view of the CCPA, that under section 103, it
is only ne<;essary "to determine obviousness to the ordinary intelligent
man." On the other hand, the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and District of
Columbia Circuits disagreed and required that nonobviousness be measured
from the perspective of a designer having ordinary skill in the art. The trial
court agreed with the latter position. 49
The plaintiff in Sidewinder contended that the trial court had erred in
assessing the obviousness issue from the perspective of an ordinary
designer rather than an ordinary, intelligent man. The Tenth Circuit thus
addressed the issue of which standard should apply to the nonobviousness
requirement in design cases. The court set forth the following:
, We are persuaded that the proper standard is that of the
"erdinary designer" in the field in question. Not only does this
standard hew more closely to the statutory wording in § 103, but
. . . it serves as a "more objective reference point" concerning
obviousness than the "ordinary observer" standard. If the latter
standard were adopted, as again pointed out in Fields, commercial success of the design among the mass of "ordinary" consumers would be a "virtually conclusive determinant" of non:obviousness, rather thail the secondary consideration it is supposed to be under the rule of Graham v. John Deere Co.
In sum, we cannot' agree with plaintiff Sidewinder that the
proper standard is that of the ordinary 'intelligent man. We feel
instead that the standard to apply is that of an ordinary designer in
,
the sport and pleasure boat field. 50
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

383 u.s. 1 (\966).
597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979).
[d. at 204.
[d. at 208.
[d. at 208-09 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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Resolving the Nonobviousness Standard Dispute

In view of the controversy in the federal courts, the CCPA decided to set a
single standard for the federal courts and the Patent and Trademark Office to
follow. S I In In re Nalbandian, S2 the CCPA addressed this issue as follows:
We believe it is appropriate to close this schism. Accordingly, with this case we hold that the test of Laverne will no longer
be followed. In design cases we will consider the fictitious person
identified in § 103 as "one of ordinary skill in the art" to be the
designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of the type
presented in the application. This approach is consistent with
Graham v. John Deere Co., which requires that the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art be determined.

J

It is apparent the "ordinary designer" standard has been
found helpful to courts in infringement litigation because of the
objective evidence which can be brought to bear on the question of
obviousness' under the tests of Graham. We believe it also can be
more effectively dealt with by an applicant during patent prosecution than can the "ordinary observer" test. For example, where
an examiner selects features from various designs, or relies on
common knowledge in the art, the possibility is present of submit. ting an affidavit from an expert in whose opinion, subjective
though it may be, it would not have been obvious to an ordinary
designer, despite knowledge (or imputed knowledge) of the prior
art to combine features or make modifications as shown in ~n
applicant's design. This possibility is not present using the "ordinary observer" test. No affiant can be quaJified as an expert ordinary observer who' might, thereby, persuade the person who is
deciding the matter that the latter's judgment of the reaction of an
ordinary observer is in error.
Rejection of the "ordinary observer" test under 35 U.S.c.
§ 103 does not preclude its application in other contexts. The
"ordinary observer" test was appJied in determining whether a
claim to a design had been infringed as long ago as Gorham Co. v.
White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871). Further, the "ordinary
observer" test has been applied when determining anticipation
under § 102 by courts which apply the "ordinary designer" test
under § 103. S3

51. See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 1500 (5th ed. 1983) (providing guidelines for the application of § 103 in the examination of design patent applications).
52. 661 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
53. [d. at 1216-17 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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The CCPA provided further guidance in the application of section 103 to
design cases in the case of In re Rosen. 54 The Rosen court stated:
While a § 103 rejection of a claimed design need not be
based on a sirigle reference, the long-standing test for the proper
combination of references has been "whether they are so related
that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one would
suggest the applicati9n of those features to the other. . . ."
Thus, there must be a.reference, a something in existence,
the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the
claimed design in order to support a holding of obviousness.
Such a reference is necessary whether the holding is based on the
basic reference alone or on the basic reference in view of
modifications suggested by secondary references. S5 .
Presently, the federal courts and the Patent and Trademark Office are following the guidelines set forth by the CCPA in the Nalbandian and Rosen
decisions.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor, the
CCPA, have interpreted federal patent law and established workable standards for the district courts and the Patent and Trademark Office to follow.
Both distrjct courts56 and the Patent and Trademark Office are presently
attempting to uniformly interpret section 103 in the determination of design
patentability. Design patent examiners must include in all section 103
rejections a statement of the rationale as to why the proposed modification
or combination of the applied references would have been obvious. Finally,
it seems clear that if the CCPA had not overruled the ordinary, intelligent
man standard, design patent examiners would have found considerable difficulty in complying with the Patent and Trademark Office policy concerning section 103.

54. 673 F.2d 388 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
55. [d. at 390-91 (citations omitted).
56. See, e.g., Whittar Indus., Ltd. v. Superior Indus. Int'l Inc., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 68, 69
(C.D. Cal. 1986).

